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I. THE PURPOSE OF THiS INVESTIGATION
The sentence imposed upon an offender is in-
fluenced by three complex factors:
1. The offense and its circumstances. In relation
to this factor there must be considered the specific
law declaring a certain act or omission to be an
offense; the punishment prescribed for those who
commit the offence; the harm that the offence is
likely to cause the victim or the public at large;
the aggravating or mitigating circumstances of the
offence and the actual harm or damage caused by
it.
2. The offender and his background. The offen-
der's economic means and position, his family, age,
social background, physical and mental health,
his criminal record or lack of previous convictions
are all comprehended under this head.
3. The third factor is the nqost elusive and
indefinite element in any sentencing policy,
namely, the attitude of the trial judge.
We may now offer the following schematic
formula:
Offence, plus Offender, plus Attitude of
Judge = Sentence.
The first two factors may be studied without much
difficulty because they crop up very frequently in
the course of the trial itself and they may be
surmised from the charge' or information , from
the circumstances of the commission of the offence
as told to the court by eve-witnesses, documentary
and circumstantial evidence. The socio-economic
background of the offender is sometimes brought
to light after conviction and before the passing of
sentence when the prosecution, probation officer
I Form of indictment in misdemeanours and contra-
ventions.
2 Form of indictment in felonies.
and the defendant himself submit evidence on the
latter's character and personality. The third
factor concerning the judicial attitude of the trial
judge is the "great unknown" in every act of
decision. This factor is obviously the most difficult
to foresee, and the possibility of successfully
isolating it and stating it is still to be explored.
But in this article, by a use of qualitative statistical
techniques and a comparison of the attitude of
individual judges in sentencing, an attempt has
been made to approach the problem from a fresh
angle.
1I. Dui-xmTo&€ oF SUBJECT MATTER
The raw material for research is constituted of
the sentences of the three district courts of Israel
(Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv, Haifa) for the year 1956.
The judgments considered were confined strictly
to convictions, which amounted in 1956 to 1,105.
The reasons for choosing the year 1956 were:
(1) that the judgments of 1956 were the most
recent data available at the time of investigation;
and (2) that there was ample statistical proof
that the judgments of the district courts for that
year were satisfactorily representative and were,
therefore, a reliable statistical sample of the
Israeli sentencing policy (magistrates courts
included) for the years 1952-1.956. This research
may, therefore, be regarded not only as a study
The medians of the methods of punishment of the
district courts for the year 1956, when grouped accord-
ing to degrees of severity, were strikingly similar to
the medians of the grouped methods of punishments of
all the criminal courts of Israel for the years 1952-
1955. The importance of this conclusion is understood
only when it is considered that the jurisdiction of the
district courts includes the more serious offences
(felonies and some of the misdemeanours) while the
jusisdiction of the magistrates' courts includes the lesser
offences only.
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of the sentencing policy of the Israeli district
courts for the year 1956 but as a critical evaluation
of that policy in the last five years.
III. CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCES AND OF
PUNISHMENTS
Offences. The conventional classification was
adopted:
1. Offences against the person;
2. Offences against property;
3. Offences against public order and administra-
tion of justice;
4. Sexual offences;
5. Fraud, embezzlement and forgery;
6. Miscellaneous offences against the Criminal
Code Ordinance, 1936.
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If an offender was charged, convicted and
sentenced for more than one offence, each belong-
ing to a different class, the more serious offence
was chosen to represent the rest for the purpose
of classification.
We decided to confine our study to offences
against the Criminal Code Ordinance of 1936
because the classification of offences against laws
other than the Code proved to be impracticable.
We excluded murder also, because, according to
Israeli law, a man found guilty of murder can be
sentenced to life imprisonment only.5 There is,
therefore, no point in studying the Israeli sentenc-
ing policy relating to this crime because the judge
has no discretionary power with respect to it; all
we have here is a rigid method of punishment.
And finally juvenile delinquents have been ex-
cluded from this study because they are dealt
with in special courts and according to a special
procedure.
Punishments have been scaled in the following
order of severity:
1. Binding over to keep the peace;
2. Probation,
3. Suspended sentence of imprisonment;
4. Suspended sentence of imprisonment and
fine;
5. Imprisonment up to one year;
6. Imprisonment from one to three years;
7. Imprisonment from three years upwards.
Fines were not included in the classification
because it is practically impossible to ascertain
I The official criminal code in Israel which was
enacted by the British Mandatory Government in 1936.
5 Penal Law (Amendment) (abolition of capital
punishment for murder, 1954.
their proper place in a scale of severity of punish-
ments and there would be no justification for
stating that imprisonment is always more severe
than a fine; for instance, a fine of £1,000 cannot
be affirmed less severe than one week's imprison-
ment. We were satisfied, moreover, that the
omission" of fines from our scale would not hamper
the implementation of the objectives of our
research. We could, nevertheless, classify the
joint punishment of suspended sentence and fine
because in the majority of cases in this group fines
did not exceed £100 and very rarely did they
exceed £200. The few sentences in which judges
inflicted joint sentences other than fines were
classified according to the heavier punishment.
IV. THE PROCESS OF SENTENCING
The task of studying the sentencing policy of
the Israeli courts would have been extremely
difficult, even impossible, had it not been for the
grounds stated in their judgment upon which
Israeli judges justify the infliction of a particular
punishment. The sentencing grounds represent
the individual judge's attitude towards punish-
ment; and the Israeli judge thus conveys to the
public (and to the court of appeal) his particular
reasons for inflicting a certain method of punish-
ment on an individual offender.6 We must bear in
mind, of course, that the sentencing grounds do
not reflect the whole of the judge's reasons for
inflicting a certain punishment, nor do they
represent the inner subjective reasons which are
mainly determined by the judge's disposition and
his personal outlook on life; moreover, the sen-
tencing grounds are sometimes given very briefly
and sometimes not given at all; but then, these
grounds are the only express declaration of the
judge's decision which is obviously the most
important factor in a sentencing policy, so that
an intensive study of these sentencing grounds is
essential to an understanding of this inquiry.
The most suitable method, for our purposes,
seemed to be to classifv the sentencing grounds
according to the purposes of the punishment which
these grounds presumably appear to vindicate.
6 There is no legal provision for the mandatory state-
ment of sentencing grounds by the trial judge, but this
is the common practice of Israeli criminal courts and
the Supreme Court of Israel directed the lower courts
that "it is extremely important that judges should state
their sentencing ground". Vide I Cr. A. 14/49
"Pesakim" Judgments of the Supreme Court, 2, p. 135;




Tile main reason for this choice of method was
that the sentencing grounds are recorded by the
judge in order to justify the culmination of the
whole trial, i.e. the imposition of the punishment.
In so doing the judge reveals to outside observers
why, in his opinion, the offender should he dealt
with in a particular way or, to put it differently,
the judge declares, by means of the sentencing
grounds, the purpose or purposes of the specific
punishment or other penal measure which was
actually inflicted on the convicted offender. We
were well aware, of course, of the considerable'
amount of artificiality in the isolation of separate
and distinct purposes of punishment in a sentenc-
ing ground, because the purpoies of punishment
are, as a rule, interwoven in the process of sentenc-
ing taken as a whole; but a certain amount of
artificiality is inevitable in this kind of research,
and we can only hope that we have been able, in
the process of drawing conclusions, to avoid any
errors arising from it.
As to the actual classification, we had to classify
1,233 sentencing grounds taken from the judgments
of Israeli courts for the year 1956. The number of
grounds in each judgment varied from a minimum
of one to a maximum of eight, with an average
number of 2.5 grounds to a judgment; but as we
have already stated a considerable number of
judgments were given without declared grounds.
By our first division sentencing grounds were
separated into aggravating grounds and mitigating
grounds; then we proceeded to classify them into
the following six groups accordinig to the purpose
or purposes of punishment which they seemed to
serve.
(1) SENTENCING GROUNDS WHICH SHOW A RELA-
TIVELY MARKED INCLINATION TOWARD SERVING
THE RETRIBUTIVE PURPOSE OF PUNISHMENT
We define retribution here as the infliction of
pain and suffering, not as a means to an end, but
as an end in itself, for an offence committed in the
past. (By stressing the past. we thus exclude any
utilitarian element, because retributive punishment
in its pure talionic form is not concerned with the
future effect of the punishment, either on the
offender punished, or on the public at large.)
The "retributive grounds- are subdivided, as
we have already pointed out, into aggravating
and mitigating grounds. The common denominator
of the former is their display of a negative emo-
tional attitude toward the convicted offender-an
attitude which is usually accompanied by expres-
sions of righteous indignation with respect to the
offence committed; this last characteristic of the
grounds in our group was recognized by many as
the most obvious sympt-vn of retributive punish-
men t.
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Three other retributive qualities were found in
this group which complied with our definition of
retrilutive punishment:
(a) They were not concerned with the probable
influence of the punishment on the future be-
haviour of the convicted offender or of potential
offenders; their sole concern was with the offence,
its surrounding circumstances and other past
events which cast a negative emotional.light on
the offender.
(b) They stressed the moral turpitude of the
offender, deduced only from the fact that he
committed an offence.
(c) They dealt exclusively with the inherent
gravity of the offence.
Another large group of retributive aggravating
grounds is characterized by an intense sympathy
displayed toward the victim or complainant; this
intense sympathy is the outcome of an inner
identification with the victim and the suffering
caused to him by the offence. This mechanism of
identification was recognized as one of the deepest
sources of the retributive element in punishment8 ;
the court views- the offence and its methods of
commission (being cruet and unfair, of course) as
if through the eyes of the victim; these eyes regard
the offender, quite naturally, with loaded negative
emotions; the obvious result is that the more
complete the court's identification is with the
victim's cause, the more intense is its emotional
negativity towards the offender and the more
severe the retributive punishment.
We now come to discuss the second sub-classifi-
cation in this group, i.e. the mitigating retributive
grounds.
The first impression on being confronted with
the expression "mitigating retributive grounds" is
7 Vide P. REIWALD, SOCIETY AND ITS CRIMINALS(1950), p. 247; ALEXANDER AND STALtB, TIlE CRIMINAL,
TILE JUDGE AND TIlE PUBLIC (1931), p. 221; H. CANTOR,
CRI E AND SOCIETY (1939), p. 395; VON HENTiG,
PUNISHIMENT (1937), p. 175; M. RADIx, Enenzies of
Society, 27 JouR. OF CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOL. (1936),
p. 348; W. L. NEUSTATTER, PSYCIIOLOGICAL DISORDER
AND CRIME (London, 1953), p. 224; PLAYFAIR AND
SINGTON, TIE OFFENDERS; SOCIETY AND TIlE ATRO-
CIOUS CRIME (London, 1957), p. 245.
1 Vide H. WEnILOFEN, Tim URGE TO PUNISII (1956),
p. 138 et seq.; VON HENTIG, op. cl., p. 20.
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that of inner contradiction in terms, because
retribution is considered to be an outcome of a
negative emotion with the ultimate end of a
harsh and severe sentence for the offender, but
the contradiction is a superficial one and it has
more to do with formal expression than with inner
meaning. Qualitatively speaking, there is an
obvious similarity between the two sub-classes;
the only variant is their direction; the mitigating
grounds move toward the lower echelons of the
scale of severity of punishment, while the aggra-
vating grounds move toward the upper echelons
of that scale. The crucial point here is that the
difference between these two sub-classes is only
directional and not qualitative. While examining
the symptoms we may notice that, whereas the
aggravating retributive grounds show negative
emotion toward the offender, the mitigating
grounds display positive emotion; and while the
iormer stress the moral turpitude of the offender
in committing the offence, the latter lighten his
moral onus; both are dealing with the past offence
and its objective gravity and neither is concerned
with the probable utilitarian effect of the punish-
ment on the future behaviour of the offender.
The mechanism of identification is present here
also but it functions to the advantage of the
offender, because the nature of the offence and its
surrounding circumstances cause our sympathy to
lie with the offender more than with the com-
plainant or victim, or certain conduct of the latter
may make it difficult for a sympathetic identifica-
tion with him and his cause. Moreover, certain
lactors relating to the personality of the offender
such as physical illness, mental stress, extreme
poverty, difficult social and economic conditions
which in themselves have no direct connexion
with the offence committed, may tend to decrease
our negative emotional load toward him and to
replace it to a certain extent by positive emotion;
in other words, we set off the offender's personal
suffering and social misery against the amount of
retributive punishment which we intend to
inflict upon him.
(2) SENTENCING GROUNDS WHICH SHOW A RELA-
TIVELY MARKED INCLINATION TOWARD SERVING
THE DETERRENT PURPOSE OF PUNISHMENT
The presumed deterrent effect of punishment is
based on the hedonistic assumption that man
weighs any given course of action according to
the pleasure to be derived or the pain to be suffered
by taking it, and decides in favour of whichever
course of action is supposed to bring him a maxi-
mum of pleasure and a minimum of pain.
The sub-class of aggravating deterrent grounds
includes grounds which stress the necessity of
deterring the actually convicted offender from
committing further offences in the future, serving
as so-called "individual prevention", and grounds,
also, which stress the presumed deterrent effect of
punishment on potential offenders, i.e. "general
prevention". In the latter case the increase in the
number of a certain type of bffence in a given
time and place is usually pointed out and the
urgent necessity of checking this increase by
means of "deterrent punishment"; then it is
sometimes stated that the only method of pre-
venting offences of a special type (without regard
to their frequency of occurrence) is to punish those
who commit them with the utmost severity. The
mitigating deterrent grounds point out, on the
other hand, that the chances are extremely remote
that the offender there and then convicted will
commit further offences in the future: there is no
need, therefore, to inflict upon him a deterrent
punishment (individual prevention). The grounds
may point out, also, that certain types of offence
are very rare and thus make it clear that a certain
case does not call for measures of "general pre-
vention".
(3) SENTENCING GROUNDS WHICH INCORPORATE
ELEMENTS OF BOTH RETRIBUTION AND DE-
TERRENCE
In this group, elements of retribution and
deterrence are so closely interwoven that the
classification of a ground as wholly belonging to
one or the other is out of the question. We grouped
them, therefore, in a special combined class,
namely, grounds which presumably intend to
serve jointly the retributive and the deterrent
purposes of punishment.
(4) SENTENCING GROUNDS WITH A RELATIVELY
MARKED REFORMATIVE LCLINATION
Before analysing the attributes of this group of
sentencing grounds we must make clear the
concept of the reformative-preventive purpose of
punishment which was coined for present con-
venience. This double purpose, which is really a
single one with two aspects, is achieved when, as
far as it is possible and expedient, punishment is
directed toward the reformation of the offender;
[Vol. so
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however, where past experience or other factors
indicate that the chances of reformation are
meagre, preventive measures, i.e. the isolation of
the offender from society, should be resoited to.
But it must be stressed that prevention as defincd
and discussed in the present research does not
mean meiely sheer physical restraint; rather it
implies constant care, supervision and suitable
confinement that will promote the application of
reformative measures, however remote the
chances of the offender's reformation, and however
hardened or dangerous he may be.
Punishment should be inflicted, therefore,
according to the stage of the offender's delin-
quency. The stages of delinquency may be likened
to the spectrum of light, with the reformative stage
of delinquency in the ultra-violet and the pre-
ventive stage in the infra-red. In the reformative
stage the offender's previous convictions are few or
none, and his chances of reformation are good.
When the stage of delinquency moves along the
spectrum toward the red, the waves are more
frequent and shorter, until one reaches the scorch-
ing infra-red which symbolizes the ultimate
preventive stage and the offender's incorrigible
recidivism.
To come back to our classification, we distin-
guish here. also, between aggravating reformative
grounds and mitigating ones: the former stress
the poor chances of the offender's reformation by
pointing out the failure of past reformative and
educational measures, or by relying on various
data concerning the offender's' personality and
socio-psychological background, indicating his
meagre chances of reformation; the mitigating
grounds point out, on the other hand, the offender's
fair chances of reformation which are deduced
from facts favourable to his character, and other
data concerning his background, his personality as
a whole, his conduct while committing the offence
and during the trial.
(5) SENTENCING GROUNDS OF A RELATIVELY
ALIRKED PREVENTIVE NATURE
The aggravating grounds in this group point out
the relative menace of the offender to society and
his "preventive stage of delinquency". This is
done by asserting his criminal record, previous
convictions and other factors concerning his
personality and psycho-social background which
call for his isolation from society for a relatively
long period. The preventive grounds point to the
lack of danger symptomsO in the character of the
convicted offender and that the possibility of his
being a menace to society is remote. We must
make clear, in this context, the demarcation
between mitigating reformative grounds and
mitigating preventive ones: the latter point out
the non-existence of negative elements, for instance
the fact that a certain offender does not have
previous convictions, while the former indicate
the positive existence of facts and data that give
us reason to believe that there is a fair chance of
the reformation of a particular offender.
(6) SENTENCING GROU.NDS WHICH PARTAKE OF
ASPECTS OF THE REFORMATIVE-PREVENTIvE
PURPOSE OF PUNISHMENT
This last class includes all grounds in which
reformative factors, i.e. the evaluation of an
offender's chances to reform, and preventive
factors, i.e. the presumption of an offender's
danger to society, are tightly interwoven without
any reasonable possibility of separation.
V. TiHE ISRAELI SENTENCING POLICY AS
REFLECTED IN THE SENTENCING
GROUNDS
Table Ia may help us to study the probable
link between sentencing grounds and the severity
of punishment. The significance test of the link
between the variants of Table Ia proved the
existence of a fairly strong correlation (P less than
0.01) between sentencing grounds and the scale of
severity of punishments. In order to show that
correlation we introduce Table 1b which shows
the medians of the numbers of sentencing grounds
in Table Ia in relation to the scale of punishments.
Table lb shows very clearly the strong relation-
ship between the sentencing grounds and the
severity of l)unishment; it can be seen that
medians of aggravating grounds are relatively
higher and correspond, therefore, to a severer
scale of punishments, while mitigating grounds
are relatively lower, and corresponding to a
lighter scale of punishments. Another conclusion,
of no less importance, which may be drawn from
'rables Ia and Ib, is that our initial classification of
sentencing grounds was a sound one; otherwise we
could not have obtained in Table lb marked and
consistent differences between the medians of
Roughlv similar to the concept of I'dal dangreux;




SENTENCING GROUNDS RELATED TO THE SCALE OF SEVERITY Or SENTENCES
Grounds
Sentences
Tot. MRP ARP .MRD ARD 'MP AP MRi ARf MD AD MIRt ARt
3 yrs up ................... 35 - 6 - 4 - 10 - 3 - 3 1 8
1-3 yrs .................... 150 1 15 1 16 2 48 8 9 - 7 21 22
To 1 yr ................... 340 8 6 3 33 28 34 39 11 - 21 76 81
Susp. Sent. & Fine ......... 371 14 2 5 31 56 12 55 4 5 11 133 43
Susp. Sent ................. 310 36 7 7 21 41 16 49 3 1 7 113 9
Prob'n................... .27 4 - - 4 2 5 9 - - - 2 1
































3 Yrs. Up .....
aggravating grounds and medians of
grounds.
Some very interesting conclusions m
from studying the medians in Tab
medians of the aggravating grounds, f
can be arranged from the highest to t
the following order: (1) reformative
(2) preventive; (3) reformative; (4)
(5) deterrent; (6) retributive-deterrent.
justifies us in concluding that, at
aggravating circumstances are con













considerable difference in height between the
SEVERITY average of the three medians of the reformative,
preventive, and reformative-preventive groups
Severity and the average of the medians of the retributive,
of deterrent and retributive-deterrent grounds; thisPunish't proves that the Israeli sentencing policy, while
.... 40% considering aggravating circumstances, gives more
.... 66 prominence to the former than to the latter.
.... 47 The order of the medians of the mitigating
... 68 groups, when arranged according to height, is as
.... 2.1 follows: (1) reformative-preventive; (2) retribu-
... 25.4 tive-deterrent; (3) preventive; (4) deterrent; (5)
30. retributive; (6) reformative. It is almost impossible
... 27.5 to detect any real trend in this arrangement be-
12.1 cause the retributive and deterrent medians and
... 2.8 reformative and preventive ones are scattered
randomly and more or less succeed one another.
The decisive test must therefore be the order of the
f mitigating differences in the heights of the medians of corre-
sponding sub-classes. This test is also decisive from
ay be drawn another point of view because it is self-evident
le 1b. The that the greater the difference in heights of medians
or instance, between an aggravating sub-class of grounds and a
:he lowest in mitigating one, the greater the influence of the
-preventive; whole class of grounds on the sentencing policy
retributive; taken as a whole.
This order The order of the differences between correspond-
least where ing medians is, therefore, as follows: (1) reforma-
cerned, the tive-preventive; (2) preventive; (3) reformative;
nced more (4) retributive; (5) deterrent; (6) retributive-
than by deterrent. The obvious conclusion is that the
there is a decisive test indicates the same order of preference
[Vol. 50
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as our first test with the aggravating grounds. We
may safely conclude, therefore, that grounds of
reformation, prevention and reformation-preven-
tion have a more marked influence on the Israeli
sentencing policy taken as a whole than grounds
of retribution, deterrence and retribution-de-
terrence.
The last comparison to be made is quantitative,
i. e. the relative amount of grounds in every class;
their order arranged from the greatest number to
the smallest is as follows: (1) retributive; (2)
preventive; (3) reformative; (4) retributive-
deterrent; (5) reformative-preventive; (6) deter-
rent. This comparigon is obviously of no great
importance, because it shows only frequency of
usage and cannot indicate any qualitative influ-
ence, whatsoever, on the sentencing policy.
VI. TnE ATTITUDE OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
In accordance with the formula stated at the
outset of this paper,
Offence, plus
Offender, plus = sentence.
Attitude of judge
The personal attitude of the judge in the present
context may epitomize the sentencing behaviour
of the Israeli judiciary. It would be pretentious to
claim that it was possible to analyse the very
complicated factors which determine the sentenc-
ing behaviour of judges belonging as it does to the
domain of general human behaviour. We do not
possess, of course, the appropriate tools to conduct
a thorough research into the motives and charac-
teristics of human behaviour; and we do not
claim that the present research is a study in
human psychology. All we have tried to do is to
draw, by means of qualitative statistics, some
general conclusions as to the effect of the sentenc-
ing behaviour of individual judges on the sentenc-
ing policy taken as a whole. In trying to isolate
and study the factor of the personality of dfie
judge in the sentencing policy, we adopted two
methodological assumptions which were applied in
a similar research into the sentencing behaviour of
some judges in the United States of America: 10
(1) Criminal cases are not selected by the judges
but are sent to them for trial by the registry,
altogether randomly and without any system or
order built upon special types of offences or
10 GAUDET, HARRIS AND ST JOHN, Individual di.ffer-
ences in the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges, JOUR. OF
CIUm. L. AND CRIMINoL.. 23 (1932-33), pp. 811 el seq.
TABLE II
COMPARING SEVERITY OF SENTENCES IN GENERAL
WITH SENTENCES FOR OFFENCES VS PERSON
AND VS PROPERTY, RESPECTIVELY
OffencesJudges Vs person % Vs property % Vs general %
R 49 - 48 50
S 50 52 49
L 90 55 62
J 46 33 40
D 15 72 30
N 10 59 71
G 46 55 46
A 88 48 62
Others 49 42 44
offenders (an assumption which is entirely appli-
cable to the practice in Israel); (2) If a sentence
is based solely on factors relating to the offence
and/or the offender, there should be a similarity
(given a sufficient number of cases) between the
average or median of the severity of sentences in
a given time (which must be of sufficient length)
imposed by one judge and the average or median
of the severity of sentences imposed by a second
judge, and, if it does not prove to be so, the con-
clusion must be that the difference was not caused
by factors concerning the offence or the offender
but by the individual differences in the personal
sentencing habits and tendencies of these two
judges.
For studying the sentencing behaviour of
Israeli judges eight judges of the district courts
were chosen on the following terms:
(1) The three district courts in Israel should
be appropriately represented. We ch6se, therefore,
three judges from the district court in Tel-Aviv,
three from Haifa and two from Jerusalem.
(2) Since our subject matter consisted in
judgments given during one year only, we had to
take care that the number of each judge's sentences
examined should not be too small. We had to
choose, therefore, those judges with a sufficient
number of cases.
Table II below gives an exposition of the
medians of the methods of punishment of the
eight judges included in our sample, according to
their severity, and containing also a comparison
between the general medians and the medians
relating to offences against property and against
the person. We confined our comparative analysis
to offences against property and the person
19591
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because we realized that the number of cases in
the other types of offence was too small for safe
conclusions. We also included in Table II, for the
sake of comparison, the general median and
medians of offences against property and offences
against the person of the rest of the sentences
which were not included in our sample because
they did not comply with the terms of choice.
We shall begin the analysis of Table II by
comparing the heights of the general medians
which represent the severity of sentencing of each
individual judge:
(1) The most lenient is Judge D1 with a general
severity median of 30 per cent, whereas the most
severe is Judge N with a general severity median
of 71 per cent. The difference between the minimum
and maximum severity is, therefore, 41 per cent,
which is a high figure if we bear in mind that the
average severity of sentencing in terms of medians'
heights is 50 per cent. 2











The mean deviation is therefore 10 per cent which
is one fifth from the total median.
A totally different picture emerges when we
compare the medians of offences against the
person:
(1) Here the most lenient judge is N with a
severity median of 10 per cent. It is worth while to
remember that this same judge was the most
severe when his sentencing policy was considered
as a whole. The severest judge when sentencing
those convicted of offences against the person
proved to be Judge L with a severity median of
90 per cent. The difference between minimum and
maximum severity in sentencing those guilty of
offences against the person is the extraordinary
figure of 80 per cent which is more than one and a
n The judges' real names, for obvious reasons, have
been suppressed.
12 The total median, of one set of grouped data is by
definition 50 Percent.
half times bigger than the total median of severity
for the same group (50 per cent).
(2) Here the order of severity is quite different


















The mean deviation here is 25 per cent which is
quite high and amounts to almost half the total
median. This high mean deviation shows the
relatively marked differences in the sentencing
policy of individual judges towards those guilty of
offences against the person.
Regarding offences against property, the
analysis is as follows:
(1) Judge D, who was the most lenient accord-
ing to the general median of his sentencing sever-
ity, is the severest punisher (median 72 per cent)
when dealing with those convicted of offences
against property; the most lenient towards this
type of offender is Judge J (median 33 per cent).
The difference here between minimum and maxi-
mum severity is, therefore, 39 per cent and the
total median is 50 per cent.










50 = total median.
48
The mean deviation in this group is only 8 per cent.
We are in a position now to draw the following
general conclusions from the analysis of the data
of Table II:
(1) The sentencing policy of only three judges,
namely, R, S and G, tends to be similar in severity
to the general average, while the other five show
a relatively marked deviation from the general
average.
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TABLE III




Maximum Minimum Max. & Min.
Suspended sentences of imprisonment ..............
Suspended sentence + fine .......................
Total of suspended sentences and suspended sentences
+ fine .......................................
Imprisonment up to one year .....................
Imprisonment to more than one year ..............











(2) This deviation is especially apparent in
offences against the person and against property.
(3) In two instances (Judges D and N), we
even noticed that a judge whose sentencing policy
toward one type of offender was of maximum
severity, became the most lenient when dealing
with another type of offender.
(4) The marked differences in sentencing policy
toward different types of offence enable us to
conclude that the sentencing policy of each
individual judge is definitely influenced by his
personal reaction to a specific type of offence.
(5) The personal attitude of the trial judge
and his individual sentencing habits have in fact
a marked influence on the severity of punishment.
We may even conclude from our analysis that in
a great many cases this indefinable element may
play a more important role in- determining the
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF THE RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF THE
VARIOUS METHODS OF PUNISHMENT USED BY
THE JUDGES IN THE SAMPLE
Punish'ts
Judges: Suep. To 1-3 Y, Bind Proba- Susp.
Sent Yrs. Yrs. over tion Sent.and Yr. Plus oe
Fine
R 57 26 7 0 0 6 10 100%
S 34 31 6 0 2 3 24 100
L 11 35 18 0 0 4 32 100
J 35 20 7 0 0 0 38 100
D 4 26 20 0 0 10 40 100
N 16 42 10 0 10 0 22 100
G 43 18 6 7 0 0 26 100
A 29 32 16 3 0 2 18 100
Others 30 22 9 3 0 6 30 100
type and severity of sentence than the nature of
the offence and the personality of the offender.
Binding over to keep the peace and imposition
of probation orders have occurred so infrequently
that they do not justify the drawing of conclusions
therefrom. The small number of probation orders
indicates that, in Israel, this disposition is still in
its experimental stage, and that the Israeli judici-
ary has not yet grasped the real importance of
probation nor the best ways and means of utilizing
it. As for the rest, we analysed the relative fre-
quency of the various methods of punishment used
by the judges in our sample by calculating for
every method of punishment: (1) the maximum
and minimum frequency of usage; (2) the difference
between these two; (3) the general average (mean)
frequency of usage; (4) the mean deviation.
Table III below shows the results of this analysis.
A comparison of the mean deviations with the
general averages in Table III brings out marked
differences in the quantitative usage of methods
of punishment by the various judges. We may
conclude therefore that not only is the severity of
punishment largely determined by the personal
sentencing habits and general attitude of the
trial judge, but the latter also influences strongly
the actual choice of methods of punishment.
Our final analysis of the sentencing behaviour
of individual judges is made in Table V. This
table shows the distribution of grounds of punish-
ment followed by our sample of eight judges
distinguishing between offences against property
and against the person.
CoNCLUSIONs
The analysis of the data in the several tables
above justifies us in the following conclusions as to
19591
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TABLE V
PERCENTAGE COMPARISON OF SENTENCING GROUNDS DECLARED BY THE EIGHT JUDGES (TABLE II)
DISTINGUISHING OFFENCES VS PERSON AND VS PROPERTY*
Grounds
Judges
MRP ARP MRD ARD MP AP MRf ARf MD AD MRt ARt
R
General ................. 0.5 0.5 1.5 7 10 10 30 0.5 - 2 30 8
Vs person ................ - - - 4 12 6 30 - - 2 36 10
Vs prop'ty .............- - - 12 12 17 34 - - 1 23 1
S
General ................. -- 0.5 0.5 3 17 11 15 1 2 3 34 14
Vs person ................ - - - - 22 9 6 - - 4 43 16
Vs prop'ty ............... - 1 1 3 12 17 23 2 - 1 29 11
L
General................. 2 4 - 7 12 14 9 4 - 2 24 22
Vs person ................ - . . . . . . . . . . .
Vs prop'ty ............... 5 10 - - - 35 10 - - - 15 25
General 4 1 3 9 20 7 9 - - 4 35 6
Vs. person 4 - 4 4 30 - 2 - - 4 30 22
Vs prop'ty ................ 4 - - 12 34 4 8 - - - 38 -
D
General ................. 9 3 1 - 10 8 5 1 - 3 25 25
Vs person ................. 5 - - 5 16 - 16 - - 16 42
Vs prop'ty ................ 15 10 - 10 - 30 - 5 5 15 10
N
General .................. 5 8 2 8 2 6 5 10 8 33 13
Vs person. ............ .... ... . ........... . 34 - - 33 33
Vs prop'ty ................ 7 14 - 4 - 11 4 21 - - 28 11
G
General .................. 10 4 1 18 11 7 4 6 1 4 26 8
Vs person ............... 10 - - 20 13 5 - - 5 5 20 10
Vs prop'ty ................ 9 9 3 12 12 9 6 9 - 3 16 12
A
General ................. 4.5 3 1.5 9 4.5 18 7.5 3 1.5 3 32.5 12
Vs person ................ .- 14 14 - . -- - - - - - 42 30
Vs prop'ty ............... 3 5 - - 10 35 7 3 3 3 23 10
The rest
General .................. 12 4 1 12 7 10 13 2 - 5 22 12
Vs person ................ 2.5 5 2.5 10 5 7.5 15 - - 10 17 25.5
Vs prop'ty ........ .. 16 4 - 13 6 12 15 5 - 2 23 4
* ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS TABLE:
MRP-Mitigating reformative-preventive MlRf-Mitigating reformative
ARP-Aggravating reformative-preventive ARf-Aggravating reformative
MRD-Mitigating retributive-deterrent MD-Mitigating deterrent
ARD-Aggravating retributive-deterrent AD-Aggravating deterrent
MP-Mitigating preventive MRt-Mitigating retributive
AP-Aggravating preventive ARt-Aggravating retributive
the sentencing behaviour of the eight judges in- property as well as towards those against the
cluded in our sample: person. He makes extensive use of suspended
1. Judge R shows some moderation in the sentences combined with fines (more than 50
severity of his sentences; this moderation is per cent.), while the number of suspended sen-
discernible in his attitude towards offences against tences uncombined is relatively small. He fre-
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quently rests his decisions upon retributive
grounds and seldom upon reformative and preven-
tive ones; the latter trait is even more apparent in
sentencing those guilty of offences against the
person and offences against property.
2. Judge S's sentences, apart from a slight
tendency to be more severe with offenders con-
victed of offences against property, are generally
of a moderate severity. He tends to pass fairly
often sentences of imprisonment for one year or
less; he makes excessive use of retributive grounds
(50 per cent.) but very sparing use of reformative,
preventive and reformative-preventive grounds.
When he deals with offences against property,
there is some decrease in his retributive grounds,
accompanied by a corresponding increase in
preventive grounds.
3. Judge L is markedly severe, and even ex-
tremely severe in cases of offences against the
person. With L sentences of imprisonment pre-
dominate, with a high proportion of imprisonment
for terms of one to three years; he makes frequent
use of suspended sentences but apparently does
not approve of joint sentences, e. g. suspended
sentences and fines. He makes considerable use of
retributive grounds but shows a special tendency
towards aggravating preventive grounds when
dealing with offences against property.
4. Judge J is extremely lenient in his sentences.,
with only a slight increase in severit- towards
those guilty of offences against the person. Of his
sentences, 75 per cent. were suspended sentences
and suspended sentences combined with fines, a
fact which makes his sentencing stand out as
unusual even in comparison with some unusual
sentencing tendencies of other judges in this
sample. J, moreover, very seldom inflicts sentences
o( imprisonment; he uses a predominance of
mitigating retributive grounds especially in dealing
with offences against property.
. Tudge D is on the whole very lenient in his
sentences, except when dealing with offences
against property which he treats with extreme
severity; he frequently employs suspended
sentences. His favourite grounds are retributive
ones, but as regards offences against property he
prefers preventive grounds. He does not make
great use, as a rule, of reformative and reformative-
preventive grounds.
6. Judge N displays considerable severity
towards all types of offence. He generally inflicts
sentences of imprisonment, and for the most part
refrains from imposing suspended sentences. With
him, reformative and preventive grounds pre-
dominate, but he can use retributive grounds quite
often.
7. Judge G shows a consistently moderate
severity in his sentences as regards all types of
offence. While he does not seem to favour sentences
of imprisonment, he may yet inflict now and
again a very long term of imprisonment; but
generally he prefers suspended sentences combined
with fines. He makes most use of reformative and
preventive grounds, using retributive grounds
relatively seldom.
8. Judge A punishes severely those guilty of
offences against the person while those guilty of
offences against property are sentenced by him
lightly. A high proportion of his sentences impose
terms of imprisonment, some of them being very
lengthy. The number of suspended sentences
passed by him is quite small. In A's pronounce-
ments preventive grounds preponderate; this
tendency is especially marked in his dealing with
offences against property.
Thus it is apparent that there are great varia-
tions between one judge and another in their
methods of sentencing and their degree of severity;
these variations cannot be attributed altogether
to the two first factors involving the offender and
the offence, but must be mainly due to the third
factor, namely the sentencing attitude and dis-
position of the individual judge himself.
What the penal or social consequences of these
variations may be, to what extent these variations
are inevitable and to what extent they are remedi-
able are some of the questions which arise out of
the conclusions reached in this paper. But impor-
tant as they are, they remain outside the scope of
this inquiry.
